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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
EDWARD SCHROLL*
The two-year period covered by this Survey has seen, to some extent,
a change to a conservative rather than a liberal approach to the Florida
Workmen's Compensation Law.' The legislative changes were, for the
most part, a response to judicial interpretation with the most dramatic
change taking place in those provisions known as the Special Disability
Fund which were originally adopted by the legislature in 1955. For pre-
sentation purposes, the subject matter covered by this Survey' will be
presented by topic, rather than chronologically.
TiE SPECIAL DISABILITY FUNDS
The two-year survey period has seen increased litigation over the'
interpretation of the Special Disability Fund and its applicability to
injured employees, as well as to the employer. It has been held that per-
manent physical impairment includes physical maladies as well as ampu-
tations.4 The combining of a pre-existing amputation of a body member
with a subsequent amputation of a different body member, resulting in
permanent total disability, was recognized by the Florida Supreme Court
as falling under the provisions of the Special Disability Fund in the case
of Jackson v. Princeton Farms Corp.' Similarly, awards for permanent
partial disability, based on wage-earning capacity loss, resulting from a
combining of two separate amputations, have been held to come within
the purview of the Special Disability Fund.6 However, when the pre-
existing amputations were not disabling, the employer was held to be
responsible for the entire loss resulting from the combining of the pre-
existing amputations with the additional industrially-caused amputation.'
In this type of situation, therefore, the Special Disability Fund provisions
are not applicable.
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1963).
2. This survey covers the legislative changes by the 1963 session of the Florida Legis-
lature and judicial decisions reported from Vol. 131, Southern Reporter, 2d Series, to and
including Vol. 150, Southern Reporter, 2d Series. For prior survey articles, see Burton,
Florida Workmen's Compensation-1935 to 1950, 5 Mimi L. Q. 74 (1950); Clements,
Workmen's Compensation, 8 MIAMI L. Q. 469 (1954); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation-
1954-1959, 14 U. MrAm L. REV. 154 (1959); and Schroll, Workmen's Compensation,
16 U. MiAmi L. REv. 216 (1961).
3.;The Special Disability Fund was previously placed under FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(d)
(1961). The 1963 legislature removed the Special Disability Fund from this section and
placed it under the Rehabilitation of Injured Employees section, which resulted in the
Special Disability Fund provisions being relocated under FLA. STAT. § 440.49(4) (1963).
4. Unit Wall Co. v. Speh, 133 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1961).
5. 140 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1962).
6. Davis v. Okeelanta Sugar Refinery, Inc., 147 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1962).
7. Young v. Dreamland Bedding Co., 133 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1961).
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The first of the fund cases decided by our supreme court, Sharer v.
Hotel Corp. of America,8 held that prior scheduled handicaps may be
combined with new scheduled handicaps resulting from industrial acci-
dents which resulted in partial wage-earning capacity loss. In that case,
the claimant had previously lost the left hand. As a result of an industrial
accident experienced while working for the employer, the claimant sus-
tained a forty per cent loss of use of the right hand. In applying the pro-
visions of the Special Disability Fund, the deputy commissioner found
that the claimant had sustained an overall fifty-nine per cent permanent
partial disability and wage-earning capacity loss, as a result of the com-
bined effects of the new disability with the pre-existing loss. Apparently,
the effect of this decision was to compensate the claimant for the actual
loss incurred as a result of the new injury sustained while with the em-
ployer by applying the provisions of the Special Disability Fund. The
result was that the fund paid for all benefits in excess of the industrially-
caused forty per cent loss of use of the right hand. The somewhat harsh
doctrine of apportionment which, if applicable, would have allowed the
claimant to recover compensation benefits for only the forty per cent loss
of use of the right hand, was held inapplicable because of the Special Dis-
ability Fund provisions.'
Following the Sharer decision, the 1963 legislature removed the
Special Disability Fund from its previous position" and placed it under
the rehabilitation of injured employees section." The subsections of the
fund were placed in different order, with the elimination of certain sec-
tions, in toto. 2 Provisions were inserted which again allowed for reim-
bursement for temporary disability benefits paid, where applicable. A
1,500 dollar "deductible" provision was inserted and a new method of
assessments for maintaining the fund, along with changes in the structure
of the fund itself, were provided by the 1963 legislature. What effect the
legislative changes made in 1963 will have upon the Special Disability
Fund and its responsibility to the employee, if any, remains to be seen.
APPORTIONMENT' 8
Since the adoption of the Special Disability Fund provisions, an
increased number of judicial interpretations of the act requiring appor-
8. 144 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1962).
9. In Cook & Pruitt Masonry, Inc. v. Leonard, 149 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1963), the deputy
commissioner apportioned an award of permanent total disability. In reviewing the appor-
tionment award, the supreme court recognized the harshness of apportionment and indicated
that the provisions of the Special Disability Fund should have been applied by the deputy,
which would have been more consistent with the overall intent and purposes of the Florida
Workmen's Compensation Law.
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(d) (1961).
11. FLA. STAT. § 440.49(4) (1963).
12. The original section, FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(d-1) (1961), was eliminated com-
pletely. The legislative intent, which was stricken by the Sharer decision, was re-enacted
and placed at the beginning of the Special Disability Fund provisions.
13. The apportionment section of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law is found
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tionment have been reported. Perhaps the greatest activity has been in the
field of "heart cases" since the deputy commissioner is required to appor-
tion, or relieve the employer of payment of any compensation, for the
pre-existing heart disease.'4 The court has further held such conditions as
pre-existing brain tumors, 5 thrombosis of the right internal carotid
artery, 6 and dormant osteomyelitis"' to be subject to apportionment." A
pre-existing asymptomatic fracture, made symptomatic by an industrial
injury, was held to be subject to the aggravation theory notwithstanding
the statutory language specifying diseases.'" The doctrine of apportion-
ment has also been applied to conditions arising subsequent to the indus-
trial accident. In Greene v. Mackle Co.,"° the doctrine was held to apply
to subsequent medical care as well as compensation benefits, if it should
be found that the employee's own misconduct necessitated increased need
for medical care and lengthened disability. However, neither the doctrine
of apportionment nor the provisions of the Special Disability Fund were
used in the case of Reed v. Sherry Frontenac Hotel Employers Serv.
Corp." In this case, the claimant suffered amputation of her right hand
as a result of an injury in a mangler. The claimant was a thirty-year old
Negro woman with a sixth grade education and an intelligence quotient
of a high grade moron. Her industrial experience had been entirely
limited to work as a maid or a laundress. As a result of the hand amputa-
tion, combined with the pre-existing condition of intellectual deficiency,
the claimant was found to be permanently and totally disabled, and the
employer was required to pay for this disability without apportionment
and without resort to the Special Disability Fund.
HEART CASES
A distinct departure was taken by our supreme court from the defini-
tion of accident" in "heart cases." In the case of Victor Wine & Liquor,
under FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(C) (1961). The aggravation of pre-existing disease section,
found under FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1961), has also been loosely termed an apportionment
section.
14. Jaquette Motor Co. v. Talley, 134 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1961). Death due to heart
attacks is also apportioned: Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1962);
Hampton v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Paper Prods. Div., 140 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
15. United Elec. Co. v. Myers, 134 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1961).
16. City of Boca Raton v. Sellers, 148 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1962).
17. Henderson v. Sol Walker & Co., 138 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1962).
18. Compare Unit Wall Co. v. Speh, 133 So.2d 304 (Fla. i961), where the pre-existing
disease was diabetes which the court placed under the provisions of the Special Disability
Fund, thereby allowing the injured workman additional compensation rather than applying
the apportionment doctrine. See also LeForgeais v. Erwin-Newman Co., 139 So.2d 401
(Fla. 1962) (aggravation of pre-existing Buerger's disease).
19. Everhart Masonry, Inc. v. Crowder, 139 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1962). See FLA. STAT.
§ 440.02(19) (1961).
20. 142 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1962).
21. 150 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1963).
22. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1961).
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Inc. v. Beasley,21 the court briefly summarized on rehearing the law ap-
plicable to "internal failure" cases and "exposure" cases. In distinguish-
ing heart cases from these two categories, the court had the following to
state:
When disabling heart attacks are involved and where such heart
conditions are precipitated by work-connected exertion, affect-
ing a pre-existing non-disabling heart disease, said injuries are
compensable only if the employee was at the time subject to
unusual strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work
he was accustomed to performing.24
The opinion of the court was unanimous on rehearing as to the com-
pensable nature of the claim, and the cause was remanded to the deputy
commissioner for apportionment. "5
WAGE-EARNING CAPACITY Loss 6
Non-scheduled disability awards to claimants, based on functional
disability rather than wage-earning capacity loss, have been reversed by
the supreme court in conformity with its 1954 decision of Ball v. Mann,2 7
which set forth the principles of wage-earning capacity loss. These prin-
ciples have been re-affirmed by the court in the period surveyed.28 What
constitutes wage-earning capacity and wage-earning capacity loss has
been the subject of divergent viewpoints. It was held that a claimant with
a functional disability had no wage-earning capacity loss when there was
testimony indicating that the claimant could earn an hourly rate in
excess of that which he was earning at the time of his injury.29 On the
other hand, in a case where the employee was found to be earning the
same salary after an injury resulting in permanent physical disability,
compensation for a twenty per cent wage-earning capacity loss was
awarded and affirmed on appeal.8" In Pazienza,8 ' the anticipated earnings
were the crucial pivotal point upon which benefits were denied, whereas
in Nuce,8" the earnings were not held to be controlling. The court ex-
plained that the test is whether one's disability caused by the industrial
accident is a handicap to securing employment in a competitive labor
market for one so afflicted, who belongs to his profession, occupation,
business or trade. Subsequently, in the case of Fort v. Hood's Dairy,
23. 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
24. Id. at 588-9.
25. For a commentary on the Victor Wine decision, see 17 U. MIA L. REv. 83 (1962).
26. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(u) (1961).
27. 75 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1954).
28. Boston-Old Colony Ins. Cos. v. Howell, 147 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1962); Sterling Equip.
Mfg. Corp. v. May, 144 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1962).
29. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Pazienza, 137 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1962).
30. Nuce v. City of Miami Beach, 140 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1962).
31. See note 29 supra.
32. See note 30 supra.
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Inc.,13 the court was confronted with an award of permanent disability
benefits to an employee who had returned to work, earning a higher wage
with the same employer. On review, the full commission reversed the
wage-earning capacity award. Certiorari was granted by the Florida
Supreme Court, which quashed the order of the full commission and
reinstated that of the deputy. The court, in reviewing the earlier decision
of Ball v. Mann,84 as well as subsequent decisions, stated:
We think the -variables pointed out and discussed in both the
last cited cases may be employed by the deputy to enlarge or
retard earning capacity as the circumstances of the case in hand
may seem fair and just. 5
From the foregoing extract, it appears that if the award of the
deputy commissioner is "fair and just," it will not be disturbed upon
review. The ostensible divergency of judicial decisions in similar factual
situations becomes less esoteric with the court's statement in the Fort
case.
Post-injury employment has also been held not to mitigate against
awards of total and permanent loss of wage-earning capacity. In Matera
v. Gautier,8" the claimant returned to work for her employer for approxi-
mately nine weeks and was given the lightest duties to perform, with
every consideration possible. When unable to do even this work, an award
of permanent total disability by the deputy commissioner was affirmed
by the supreme court. In the later decision of Jackson v. Princeton Farms
Corp.,87 it was held that two and one-half years of post-injury employ-
ment did not prevent an award of permanent total disability.
Awards of permanent total loss of wage-earning capacity have been
reversed when the evidence was insufficient to justify the award,88 or
when the condition was still subject to remedial care and had not yet
reached a permanent status. 9 The doctrine of wage-earning capacity was
also applied to scheduled losses resulting from occupational diseases.4
MEDICAL BENEFITS
4 1
In appropriate situations, the deputy commissioner is licensed to
33. 143 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1962).
34. See note 27 supra.
35. Fort v. Hood's Dairy, Inc., 143 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1962).
36. 133 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1961).
37. 140 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1962).
38. Trieste v. Anchell, 143 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1962). In Trieste, the award of permanent
disability resulting from an ankle injury was reversed for lack of evidence, even though
the court indicated that the claimant might very well have been permanently and totally
disabled from the injury.
39. Sanz v. Eden Roc Hotel, 140 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1962). An award of 3% permanent
partial disability following a hernia repair was held premature since jurisdiction was
reserved to determine future remedial treatment.
40. Gordon v. Walgreen's Drug Store, 149 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1963). The opinion of the
court expressly limited its decision to the facts of the case.
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1961).
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enter awards providing for future medical care to the extent required.42
Included in the medical benefits have been awards for nursing services
and awards to the wife for this purpose have been affirmed irrespective of
whether the wife had given up her employment to care for her indus-
trially-injured husband.4" Awards for payment of nursing services have
been held in abeyance until such time as a nurse was actually hired to
care for the industrially-injured workman in situations where no one in
the family unit provided the services.44
In the case of Twisdale v. Womack & Martel,45 an industrially-
injured claimant sustained total loss of vision of one eye due to hysteria.
The treating psychiatrist testified that the claimant had refused sodium
pentathol and, further, had not permitted himself to be hypnotized. An
award of total loss of vision of the eye was reversed and remanded. The
court stated that if subsequent testimony would indicate that the recom-
mended psychiatric treatment would help the claimant, then, in such
event, compensation benefits should be terminated until the claimant
would agree to submit himself to the treatment.
The deputy's duty to evaluate all the testimony, including, that of
medical experts, as well as his duty to set forth his reasons for the
acceptance or rejection of medical testimony was re-emphasized.46 How-
ever, insofar as medical testimony is concerned, the deputy commissioner
need not make findings in terms of the scientific cause of the condition,
but findings in terms of effect are sufficient.47 Similarly, the medical
expert need not set forth his opinion in terms of percentages on residual
permanent disability, but may express a disability rating in the broader
terms of "minimal" to "moderate. 48
The burden has been placed on the claimant to show good cause for
the failure of the treating doctors to file medical reports.4 9 No decisions
have been rendered regarding the claimant's responsibility for the medical
care in situations where the failure to file reports was caused by the doctor
or institution rendering the treatment rather than by the claimant. How-
ever, in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Jones,50 the employer raised as a defense failure on the part of the
42. Gordon v. Walgreen's Drug Store, 149 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1963); Platzer v. Burger,
144 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1962).
43. Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1961).
44. Poinciana Chinaware, Inc. v. Forsythe, 136 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1961).
45. 148 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1962).
46. Crosby v. Tampa Elec. Co., 142 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1962).
47. Sterling Equip. Mfg. Corp. v. May, 144 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1962).
48. Edwards v. Metro Tile Co., 133 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1961).
49. Sterling Equip. Mfg. Corp. v. May, 144 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1962). See Corporate
Group Serv., Inc. v. Lymberis, 146 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1962) (good cause shown); Oolite
Concrete Co. v. Carver, 145 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1962) (good cause not shown) ; Jaquette Motor
Co. v. Talley, 134 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1961) (cause remanded for further testimony).
50. 134 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1961).
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claimant to have medical reports filed. The employer asserted it should
be excused from the payment of medical care rendered because of the
failure of the medical reports to be filed with the employer and the
Florida Industrial Commission. Based on the facts in the case, it was held
that the employer waived the requirements of the provision regarding
filing of reports5 on the theory that the conduct of the employer may be
such as to waive the required filing.
COVERAGE
Coverage under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act has been
extended to allergic reactions resulting from typhoid injections adminis-
tered during working hours. The inoculations were given because the
drinking water was believed to be contaminated due to generalized hurri-
cane damage.5 2 Coverage was also extended to a migratory farm worker,
who during non-working hours, sustained injuries when he fell down the
steps of the barracks which had been furnished to him by his employer
as living quarters.58 The benefits of the act were denied to the widow of
a deceased who suffered a fatal heart attack on the employer's premises
during working hours while pruning an orange tree his employer had
given him. 4 Benefits were also denied to a detective employed by the city
of Miami Beach, who sustained injuries while attempting to arrest a truck
driver outside the city's jurisdictional limits. This result obtained al-
though it was contended that in attempting to effectuate the arrest the
claimant was ultimately benefiting his employer since the belligerent
truck driver was on his way to Miami Beach.55 Conversely, back injuries
sustained while engendering good will for the employer in assisting a
good customer's employee were held compensable.56
Under the theory of resolving all doubts in favor of the employee, an
epileptic seizure triggered by excessive work was held compensable.Y On
the other hand, the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act were
denied by the supreme court to an employee who had a multitude of pre-
existing physical infirmities, including advanced age, even though the
deputy commissioner was convinced that the claimant had sustained his
disability as a result of conditions arising out of employment.58 The court
reasoned that the "accident" factor could not be established by the evi-
dence. In the decision of Martin Co. v. Carpenter,9 coverage was denied
51. FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1961).
52. Suniland Toys & Juvenile Furniture, Inc. v. Karns, 148 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1963).
53. Carr v. United States Sugar Corp., 136 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1962).
54. Heath v. Thomas Lumber Co., 140 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1962).
55. City of Miami Beach v. Valeriani, 137 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1962).
56. Julian v. Port Everglades Terminal Co., 135 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1961).
57. Diamelio v. Royal Castle, 148 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1962).
58. Murray v. City of St. Petersburg, 138 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1962).
59. 132 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1961). See also Thomas v. Carter Fruit & Produce Co., 137
So.2d 573 (Fla. 1962), where increased difficulty due to usage of a previously injured
arm was held not to be the result of the new injury.
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an injured employee who for a period of over twenty years had suffered
back pain which had required medical care, under the theory that no
accidental injury had been shown. In obtaining employment, the claimant
failed to disclose the prior back difficulty on her employment application.
Recognizing that the legislature had not acted on the extent or effect of
the false representation on the part of an employee in obtaining employ-
ment, the court went on to lay down the rule that a false representation
of physical condition or health in procuring employment, will preclude
coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act if a causal relationship
between the injury and false representation is shown and:
(1) The employee knew the representation to be false;
(2) The employer relied on the false representation; and
(3) Such reliance resulted in consequent injury to the employer.
It is interesting to note that in the facts of this case, the employer con-
tinued the employment of the claimant after having knowledge of the
back complaints. The claimant was apparently able to do the lighter work
given to her but when required to do prolonged standing and bending,
found herself unable to do so because of increased pain.
Following the Carpenter decision, an award of compensation was
affirmed in the case of Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co." In this case, a
woman gradually developed back pain while packing grapefruits for the
employer. On the following day, she returned to her job and worked for
a period of two hours but was unable to continue because of severe back
pain. Her condition was diagnosed as a herniated disc. In affirming the
award, the court defined and summarized the law on injuries arising out
of and in the course of employment. The court pointed out that the cir-
cumstances of the work were the causative factors of the injury and
stated further:
An unexpected injury received in the ordinary performance of a
duty in a usual manner is an "injury by accident within the
purview of Workmen's Compensation without the showing of
anything fortuitous."'"
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
A determination of average weekly wage, in a situation where the
injured workman is concurrently engaged in two or more employments
and has derived wages from both employments, has had judicial interpre-
tation. In laquette Motor Co. v. Talley, 2 it was held that income derived
from concurrent but excluded railroad employment could not be con-
60. 138 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1962); accord, Zerwal v. Caribbean Modes, Inc., 145 So.2d
878 (Fla. 1962).
61. Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308, 311 (Fla. 1962).
62. 134 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1961).
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sidered in arriving at the injured employee's average weekly wage. Subse-
quently, in the case of J. J. Murphy & Son, Inc. v. Gibbs,68 the court
held only wages from concurrent similar employment could be combined
in determining average weekly wage. In determining the similarity, the
court went on to state that it was the sameness or similarity of the work
performed by the employee, rather than the thing done or produced by
the employer, that would be controlling although the latter factor may
also be considered. The court was careful to point out that its opinion on
average weekly wage should be distinguished from wage-earning capacity
since it was found that the claimant's average weekly wage was twenty
dollars per week, whereas her proven wage-earning capacity was seventy
dollars per week (the combined wages). The statutory provision antici-
pating that a minor's wages would increase during the period of disability,
which would allow this fact to be taken into consideration in determining
average weekly wage, 4 was held inapplicable where the minor was killed
or died as the result of an industrial accident."6
The statutory limitations placed upon the definition of part-time
workers, under the average weekly wage section, 6 was changed by the
1963 legislature. The legislature deleted from the definition of part-time
workers those employees who were unable to find part-time work or whose
employer failed to provide full-time work, or whose attendance in a
school or college did not permit full-time employment. 67
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In order to bar a claim for compensation benefits, the statute of
limitations must be raised at the first hearing. The "first hearing" was
defined by the supreme court as being the first hearing before the deputy,
called pursuant to a notice sent by the Florida Industrial Commission
with the proper ten-day allowance. 8 When there have been past statutory
changes in the statute of limitations and the time has not already run at
the time of the statutory change, the claimant will receive the benefit of
the amending statute.6 " The distinction existing between the various
statutes of limitations contained in the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Act was emphasized in the case of Boden v. City of Hialeah.70 In that
case, the statute of limitations had already run on an order which had
been previously entered. A claim was filed seeking further benefits. As a
63. 137 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1962). For cases in accord with Gibbs, but with dissenting
opinions, Wolf v. City of Altamonte Springs, 148 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1962); Central Welding &
Iron Works v. Renton, 145 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1962).
64. FLA. STAT. § 440.14(4) (1961).
65. Peterman v. Floriland Farms, Inc., 131 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1961).
66. FLA. STAT. § 440.14(5) (1961).
67. FLA. STAT. § 440.14(5) (1963).
68. Perry v. Robbins & Son Roofing Co., 145 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1962).
69. Garris v. Weller Constr. Co., 132 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1961).
70. 132 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1961).
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defense, the employer and carrier asserted that the claim was governed
by the 1951 one-year modification section and, as a result, the claim was
barred by the one-year statute of limitations. In affirming the deputy's
denial of the defense, the supreme court stated that the claim did not
seek modification but sought additional benefits and, consequently, the
statute of limitations under the modification section was not involved.
The doctrine of estoppel has been applied to carriers who, by letter,
have authorized medical treatment but subsequently, after the statute of
limitations had run, denied responsibility by virtue of the running of the
statutory period."' In Platzer v. Burger,72 a claim was filed seeking en-
titlement to lifetime medical benefits or for as long as doctors indicated
that treatment was required. The deputy commissioner found that the
evidence supported the claim but declined to enter an order requiring such
medical care on the ground that it would toll the running of the statute
of limitations. On review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the full
commission's affirmance of the deputy's order and remanded the cause,
stating that where the facts are as demonstrated, the deputy commissioner
may enter an order requiring the employer or carrier to furnish medical
care for such period as the nature of the injury or process of recovery
may require. In adopting this construction, the court gave effect to the
rule that where the act permits divergent interpretations, one favorable
to the employee and the others unfavorable, the interpretation more
favorable to the employee will be adopted. The same point, i.e., the tolling
of the running of the statute of limitations, was subsequently involved
in a case in which an order had been entered requiring the payment of
all medical expenses which the claimant had incurred, or might incur, as a
result of the injury.78 Although the deputy commissioner's terminology
did not track the statute, the court held it sufficient to toll the running of
the statute of limitations.
Following the above decisions concerning the tolling of the statute of
limitations under the medical benefits sections, the 1963 legislature
amended the medical limitations section.74 Although the statute, as
amended, contains greater verbiage, it is questionable that the effect of
the rulings in the Platzer 5 and the Phillips76 cases was overcome.
PROCEDURE
Once a claim has been filed,77 the deputy commissioner may enter-
tain the claim and enter an order on all matured issues. 78
71. Howanitz v. Biscayne Elec., Inc., 139 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1962).
72. 144 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1962).
73. Phillips v. Triangle Constr. Co., 145 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1962).
74. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(3) (b) (1963).
75. See note 72 supra.
76. See note 73 supra.
•77. Gamage v. Reeks, 142 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1962).
78. Blackwood v. Penwoven, Inc., 140 So.2d .108 (Fla. 1962); Poinciana Chinaware,
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The obligation of the deputy commissioner to make adequate find-
ings of fact has been restated by our supreme court during the period
surveyed.7" Matters not properly placed into evidence may not be relied
on to form the basis of a decision, 0 nor are statements made at a confer-
ence sufficient to support an order, unless the parties so stipulate.81
Awards denying benefits based on "observations of the deputy" have
been reversed where the observations were too uncertain, indistinct, spec-
ulative and conjectural.8 2 The deputy commissioner may draw inferences
from the evidence, 8 provided the proof furnishes a reasonable basis and
would support such an inference. 4 Specifically, it has been held that the
deputy must reach his conclusions from the entire record.8" When the
evidence is close, it is the duty of the deputy commissioner to resolve the
doubts in favor of the claimant."' Causal relationship between the acci-
dent and the disability must be established by medical evidence with
reasonable medical certainty.87 In this light, it should be noted that the
"logical cause" theory has been utilized to determine the cause of the
claimant's physical condition.88 Insofar as medical evidence is concerned,
the deputy has been required to explain his acceptance or rejection of the
opinions of medical witnesses8" even though he has the right to believe
that testimony which he so chooses. 0
In permanent total disability cases, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer to show that the employee is not permanently and totally dis-
abled once the injured employee establishes that he can do no work on an
uninterrupted basis. 1 Once this fact is shown, the burden then shifts to
Inc. v. Forsythe, 136 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1961) (party will be estopped to later present matters
which were matured and could have been presented and litigated).
79. Bertele v. Wilson Roofing Co., 147 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1962); Hogan v. Central Sand Co.,
141 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962) (award unrealistic and not substantiated by facts as reflected
by record); Rainbow Poultry Co. v. Ritter Rental Sys., Inc., 140 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1962)
(findings inconsequential due to lack of materiality with regard to ultimate issues);
Waite v. City of Miami Beach, 138 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1962); Montclair Homes, Inc. v.
Thompson, 138 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1962) (findings of medical opinion not based on facts).
80. Everhart Masonry, Inc. v. Crowder, 139 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1962).
81. Blackwood v. Penwoven, Inc., 140 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1962). See also for a definition
of "first hearing," Perry v. Robbins & Son Roofing Co., 145 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1962).
82. Taylor v. Brennan Constr. Co., 143 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1962).
83. Matera v. Gautier, 133 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1961).
84. Feinberg v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1962); Howanitz v. Biscayne
Elec., Inc., 139 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1962).
85. Lee v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 148 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1962).
86. Olsen v. Winter Park Racquet Club, 142 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1962). Accord, Lee v.
Florida Industrial Comm'n, 148 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1962).
87. Reed v. Whitmore Elec. Co., 141 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1962).
88. Greene v. Mackle Co., 142 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1962); Olsen v. Winter Park Racquet
Club, 142 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1962) (conditions of employment found to be cause of death,
using logical cause theory).
89. Tolbert v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 148 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1963).
90. Johnny's Welding Shop v. Eagan, 143 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1962).
91. Trieste v. Anchell, 143 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1962); Matera v. Gautier, 133 So.2d 732
(Fla. 1961). See also Jackson v. Princeton Farms Corp., 140 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1962), in which
the statutory presumption of temporary total from scheduled injuries was not overcome
by two and one-half-year post-injury employment.
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the employer to show that work exists which the injured employee can
perform and that the work is available to him.92
The deputy has been held to the duty of awarding expert witness fees
to those experts who appear before him even though he has not considered
their testimony in arriving at his opinion.9" On those issues which are not
complete or which cannot be completed, the deputy commissioner may
reserve jurisdiction so that the matters can be subsequently determined.94
When modification of a prior order is sought, the supreme court held
in Taylor v. Brennan Constr. Co." that the deputy commissioner may
review .the entire history of the claim once a change of condition is shown.
When insufficient findings of fact are made by the deputy commis-
sioner, the cause will be remanded for the entry of an order containing
adequate findings of fact." However, upon review, the full commission is
not authorized to make its own findings of fact independent of those
made by the deputy commissioner.97 Furthermore, when the deputy com-
missioner's order is accurate but his reasons are erroneous, the award will
nevertheless be affirmed.9" As a consequence, in the absence of a misap-
plication of the law, the full commission is bound by the deputy commis-
sioner's conclusions, 9 but when the situation is presented where the full
commission reaches a different legal conclusion than that of the deputy
commissioner on the same facts, this subsequent conclusion will be
affirmed by the court, if not erroneous. °00 Generally, great weight is given
to the administrative interpretation of the law, but if clearly erroneous,
the commission's interpretation will be set aside.1 1 When the holding of
the full commission is not disturbed on review, it becomes the law of the
case when subjected to further consideration at the trial level, °' and any
ambiguity which arises is liberally interpreted in favor of the employee.0 3
Although the full commission has the power to appoint deputy com-
missioners who have resigned from office, as deputies pro hac vice, the
92. Taylor v. Brennan Constr. Co., 143 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1962).
93. Stich v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 139 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1962).
94. Reed v. Whitmore Elec. Co., 141 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1962) (attorneys' fees); Sanz v.
Eden Roc Hotel, 140 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1962) (wage-earning capacity loss); Conroy v.
Anthony Abraham Co., 138 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1962).
95. 143 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1962).
96. Hedrick v. Bailey-Lewis-Williams, Inc., 140 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1962).
97. Damon v. Central Hotel, 135 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1961).
98. Escarra v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 131 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1961) (reasonable man test
applying under notice requirement excusing lateness of notice, rather than "ignorance of
the law.").
99. West v. Sampson, 142 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1962).
100. Toney Builders, Inc. v. Huddleston, 149 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1963).
101. Southeastern Util. Serv. Co. v. Redding, 131 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1961).
102. Wurwarg v. Lighthouse Restaurant, 131 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1961) (orders of Florida
Industrial Commission quasi-judicial nature).
103. Greene v. Mackle Co., 142 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1962).
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failure to do so renders an award entered by the deputy, after leaving
office, a nullity.10 4
Failure to comply with the appellate rules promulgated by the com-
mission has resulted in the dismissal of an appeal'015 even though the rules
are discretionary with the full commission. 6
Judicial review of full commission orders by the Florida Supreme
Court will be limited to those issues properly before the full commission
and which are specific in nature. 7 Orders of the full commission which
are not finalin nature will not be reviewed by the supreme court. 08 How-
ever, where a cause is remanded by the full commission to the deputy
commissioner because of inadequate findings of fact, the commission's
determination that there are inadequate findings of fact is, in itself,
reviewable.'019 When the decision of the full commission is quashed by the
supreme court and further grounds remain for reversal which are meri-
torious but which have not been decided by the full commission, the cause
will be remanded for consideration of the remaining grounds, so that the
matter can be determined with finality.10
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Again, in the period surveyed, the basis for and determination of the
amount for awards of attorneys' fees has been actively litigated. In con-
formity with its prior decisions,"' awards of attorneys' fees have been
reversed and remanded by the Florida Supreme Court when no evidence
had been presented as to the reasonable value of the services." 2 When the
amount of attorneys' fees is in dispute, the deputy commissioner may
receive evidence as to their reasonable value by affidavit. If the affidavits
are objected to, however, experienced attorneys must be called to testify as
to the reasonable value of the services rendered." 3 Awards of attorneys'
fees have been held proper where the attorney was successful in recover-
104. City of Miami Beach v. Carter, 142 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962).
105. General Acc. Group v. Lieber, 146 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1962) (failure to deposit costs).
106. Schneider v. Gustafson Indus., Inc., 139 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1962) (full commission
abused discretion in dismissing application for review for failure to file transcript within
forty-five days).
107. Shell's City, Inc. v. Coles, 145 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1962) (words "contrary to law,
contrary to evidence, and contrary to the law and evidence" held patently inadequate as
grounds for review).
108. Bachelder v. Four Way Nursery, 136 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1962).
109. Patrylo v. Nautilus Hotel, 142 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1962). See also Steel v. Johnston,
143 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1962) (commission orders reviewable if they conclude one or more
essential elements of the cause).
110. Ibid; Damon v. Central Hotel, 135 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1961).
111. See Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv. 216 (1961).
112. Scott v. Soldo, 138 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1962).
113. Trieste v. Anchell, 143 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1962); Johnson v. Sun Gold Septic Tank
Co., 139 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1962); LeForgeais v. Erwin-Newman Co., 139 So.2d 401 (Fla.
1962).
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ing medical benefits only." 4 Similar awards were affirmed even in the
absence of any awards benefiting the employee as in City of Miami Beach
v. Schiffman." The Court stated that an award of an attorney's fee was
proper where the services of the attorney were needed to defeat the
employer's resistance of more than twenty-one days' duration after the
filing of a claim. Annual attorneys' fees, based on an annual percentage
of disability benefits paid to an injured employee, were held erroneously
awarded and reversed in Matera v. Gautier."" In arriving at the reasonable
value of attorneys' fees, it was held that the relative size of the employer
was an important factor." 7 The award of interim attorneys' fees, as well
as reservation of jurisdiction for attorneys' fees, is within the power of
the deputy commissioner.18 However, the deputy has no power to resolve
a conflict between two or more attorneys as to their pro rata share of an
overall attorneys' fee awarded for the legal services performed for an
injured employee." 9
Awards of attorneys' fees for successful appellate review of an award,
contingent upon additional success at the trial level, have been affirmed. 20
However, awards of attorneys' fees for successful review of an order
before the full commission were lost when the full commission's decision
was subsequently quashed by the supreme court.' 2 ' Attorneys' fees have
been denied for successful appellate review in a situation where the peti-
tion for the fees had not been timely filed.' 22
DUPLICATE BENEFITS
Receipt of workmen's compensation benefits as a result of an indus-
trial accident, along with other types of wage loss protection, has also been
the topic of judicial interpretation in the period surveyed. In City of
Miami v. Graham,12 a municipal employee was not permitted to recover
his longevity pension in addition to workmen's compensation benefits,
while in Bertele v. Wilson Roofing Co.,'24 the fact that the claimant was
receiving social security benefits was held immaterial to a claim for addi-
tional compensation. In Edwards v. Metro Tile Co.,'25 the supreme court
114. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Jones, 134 So.2d
244 (Fla. 1961).
115. 144 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1962).
116. 133 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1961).
117. Tampa Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Watts, 132 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1961).
118. Reed v. Whitmore Elec. Co., 141 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1962).
119. Waldrop v. Miller Moderns, 136 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1961).
120. Toney Builders, Inc. v. Huddleston, 149 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1963).
121. Thomas v. Carter Fruit & Produce Co., 137 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1962).
122. Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 142 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1962).
123. 138 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1962) (pension involved was for longevity rather than disa-
bility). The receipt of duplicate benefits by state or municipal employees is governed by
FLa. STAT. § 440.09(4) (1961).
124. 147 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1962).
125. 133 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1961), 17 U. MiAmi L. REv. 90 (1962).
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held that an industrial claimant may apply for and receive unemployment
compensation benefits concurrently with the receipt of temporary total
disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
THIRD PARTIES AND SUBROGATION
Unsuccessful attempts were made during the period surveyed to have
the owners of heavy equipment held liable for injuries caused by that
equipment. In Zenchak v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc.,'26 the employee
was injured by a truck rented by his employer and driven by a fellow
employee. The injured employee's damage suit was dismissed when the
court held that the owner of the truck was not vicariously liable under
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. In Stone v. Buckley," 7 an at-
tempt was made to have the owners of a crane respond for civil damages
under the theory that the crane's owners did not have sufficient employees
to bring them under the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that although the
owners did not come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, their em-
ployees did by virtue of the owners' being subcontractors under a general
contractor and that as a consequence, the plaintiff, an employee of the
crane owners, was limited to workmen's compensation benefits. However,
when there is no general contractor, prohibition proceedings have been
denied to prevent the civil action. 2 s
Uninsured employers have been held not responsible for their injured
employees under civil damage actions when the injured employee elected
to claim workmen's compensation benefits even though the claim was dis-
missed for lack of prosecution.'
The subrogated interest of employers or their carriers, when third
party suits are involved, has had some judicial scrutiny. The amount of
subrogated interest lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge. ° The
law which existed at the time of the accident will govern the employer-
carrier's subrogated interest. 8 ' A reduction of the carrier's subrogated
interest to less than 100 per cent in a situation where the carrier brought
the suit after one year had elapsed from the time of the accident, was
held to be error in General Guar. Ins. Co. v. Moore."2 It was reasoned
that since it was the carrier rather than the employee who brought the
delayed suit, it should be able to recover 100 per cent of its compensation
126. 150 So.2d 727 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
127. 132 So.2d 613 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). Accord, Street v. Safway Steel Scaffold Co., 148
So.2d 38 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
128. State v. Luckie, 145 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
129. Williams v. Duggan, 140 So.2d 69 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
130. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 131 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1961). See also London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fairfield, 132 So.2d 459 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
131. Home Indem. Co. v. McAdams, 139 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
132. 143 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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expenditure. In United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Reed Constr. Corp.,'88
an insurance carrier paid out death benefits under the Federal Long-
shoremen's Act and subsequently filed an action in the state circuit court
to recover the loss. It was held that under the Federal Longshoremen's
Act the action could be maintained in the state court notwithstanding the
existence of the Florida death statute.3 4
ADDITIONAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST
Compensation claims for permanent disability benefits in excess of
that provided by statute in cases where the injury was basically a hernia,
have uniformly been remanded for further findings. In Sherman v.
Peoples Water & Gas Co.,'35 an unrepairable hernia was found to have
resulted in a twenty-five per cent permanent partial disability. The cause
was remanded to the deputy commissioner to determine the employee's
wage-earning capacity loss. In Patrylo v. Nautilus Hotel,"3 6 the injured
employee had gone through three unsuccessful hernia repairs and was
found to have a twenty per cent permanent disability of the body as a
whole. This claim was also remanded to the deputy commissioner for
further findings. In Sanz v. Eden Roc Hotel,"7 the injured workman had
successfully undergone the hernia repair but continued to suffer pain
because of an involvement of a femoral nerve with post-operative scar
tissue. The three per cent permanent partial disability award was reversed
and remanded to the deputy commissioner. Subsequently, in Frohman
Gear Co. v. Fellows,"' a bulge, which became manifest six months after
an accident and which was first seen by a doctor twelve months after the
accident, was found not to have occurred suddenly and, as a conse-
quence, not covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In reviewing dependency awards, it was held in Floriland Farms,
Inc. v. Peterman,"'I that a sixteen-year old deceased employee had, as a
result of a tight family unit, two minor sisters and two minor brothers
dependent upon him. An award of dependency benefits for these minors
was affirmed. In King v. Keller,4° a wife who had been separated from
her husband for a period of thirty-one years was found to be the legal
dependent of the deceased husband, who had remarried without divorce
during the extended period of separation. The test for dependency was
held to be legal entitlement to support.
Mental disabilities such as anxiety complexes resulting from slight
133. 132 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
134. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1961)
135. 138 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1962).
136. 142 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1962).
137. 140 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1962).
138. 149 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1963).
139. 131 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1961).
140. 141 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1962).
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trauma, have been held compensable.' 4 ' An asymptomatic pre-existing
fractured arm was also held compensable under the aggravation theory
when a subsequent accident caused the fracture to become symptom-
atic. 42
In an occupational disease case, the deputy commissioner determined
that the claimant-plasterer had suffered temporary disability during his
last employment, but assessed an award of permanent disability against
an earlier employer, under the theory that the disease had already be-
come permanent before the claimant's separation from the earlier posi-
tion. On review, the award was reversed by the court which held that the
last injurious exposure rule under our statute governs both temporary
total and permanent partial disability. 43
The determination of an employer-employee relationship where there
was a special employment situation, was discussed in detail in the case of
Rainbow Poultry Co. v. Ritter Rental Sys., Inc.'44 The court restated the
elements governing employment contracts from its earlier "loaned em-
ployee" decisions in which the employer, whose work was being done at
the time of the accident, was held to be responsible for the resulting com-
pensation benefits.
ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The 1963 legislature set the number of deputy commissioners at
twenty, allowing the number to be increased to twenty-one beginning
July 1, 1964.1 The limitation on the salary of the chairman of the com-
mission of 6,000 dollars was removed when the 1963 legislature pre-
scribed that only one-half of the total salary of the chairman of the
Florida Industrial Commission shall be from state sources." 6 The salary
of the full-time deputy commissioners was increased to 13,000 dollars
per year, an annual increase of 1,000 dollars. 47
Minor changes also were made in the public hearing process for
establishing rules and procedure in finding the type or types of violations
constituting emergencies under the safety rules and provisions section of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 148
COMMISSION RULES
The rules of procedure in workmen's compensation cases before the
Florida Industrial Commission remain unchanged except that Rule No. 5,
regarding the filing of briefs, has been changed so as to comply more
141. Oolite Concrete Co. v. Carver, 145 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1962).
142. Everhart Masonry, Inc. v. Crowder, 139 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1962).
143. Conner v. Riner Plastering Co., 131 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1961).
144. 140 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1962). See also Jenkins v. Peddle, 145 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1962)
(attempt to hold franchised taxicab operator as employer unsuccessful).
145. FLA. STAT. § 440.45(1) (1963).
146. FLA. STAT. § 440.44(2) (1963).
147. FLA. STAT. § 440.45(3) (1963).
148. FLA. STAT. § 440.56(8) (1963).
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closely with Rule 3.7 of the Florida Appellate Rules. Of significance is
the added requirement that failure of the appellant to file a brief within
the time specified shall be cause for dismissal of the application for
review although the commission has the discretion to excuse the filing of
a brief when either the appellant or the appellee is not represented by
counsel. In addition, Rule 16, governing advance payments of compensa-
tion and discharge of liability of compensation by a lump sum payment,
has undergone minor changes. The rule now allows informal approval of
a 1,000 dollar advance payment rather than the previous 500 dollar limit.
The deputy commissioner was given the discretion as to whether or not
he desired to have the rehabilitation department of the commission in-
vestigate advance payments and/or lump sum releases under the appro-
priate provision.14
CONCLUSION
Within the period surveyed, the supreme court reviewed orders of
the full commission and rendered opinions in one hundred cases. The full
commission affirmed fifty-eight deputy commissioner's orders. Of these,
the court affirmed the full commission's orders on twenty-seven occasions.
The full commission had reversed thirty-seven orders of. deputy commis-
sioners awarding benefits to claimants, and reversed four awards denying
benefits. In turn, of the thirty-seven reversals, the supreme court quashed
thirty-two. Two of the four reversals of the deputy commissioner's denial
of benefits to the claimant were also quashed. 10
The most significant development of the period surveyed has taken
place in the fields of apportionment and the Special Disability Fund. Con-
siderable confusion has resulted as to when to apply the aggravation of
disease section, the apportionment section, the Special Disability Fund
section, or to simply impose full responsibility upon the employer. It is
doubtful that the 1963 legislative changes in the Special Disability Fund
altered the injured workmen's rights or benefits which had previously
been enjoyed. 5' The 1963 legislative session broadened the employer's
reimbursement possibilities from the Special Disability Fund in addition
to enacting a deductible provision. The period surveyed has also seen the
evolution of new legal concepts specifically covering "heart cases" in
addition to further refinement in the "loss of wage-earning capacity"
concept.
It is anticipated that in the ensuing two-year period, the doctrine of
apportionment will be clarified by application of the Special Disability
Fund and that further legislative changes in the Special Disability Fund
provisions will be made.
149. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(10) (1963).
150. Statistics are not available as to the number of the writs of certiorari denied
without opinion.
151. Address by Senator John Matthews, Member of the 1963 Florida Legislature, to
the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards & Commissions, Miami Beach,
Florida, November 11, 1963.
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